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THE ROLE OF LITIGATION IN GAY RIGHTS: 
THE MARRIAGE EXPERIENCE 
WILLIAM C. DUNCAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
However one might feel about the substantive question of whether 
marriage ought to be redefined to include same-sex couples, all will probably 
agree that the question of how this issue came to the forefront of legal debate is 
fraught with interest.  From the early cases filed in the 1970s and 1980s1 to the 
groundbreaking Hawaii Supreme Court decision in 1993 which branded 
marriage a form of sex discrimination,2 progress on redefining marriage 
seemed unlikely.  In the decade after the Hawaii decision there were a handful 
of court decisions finding in favor of the advocates of redefining marriage.  
None of these decisions, however, led to the issuance of marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples.3  That changed in November 2003 when the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court changed the Commonwealth’s longstanding definition 
of marriage to “the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion 
of all others.”4  Since then, two trial courts have ruled in favor of claims to 
redefine marriage5 and lawsuits are pending in five additional states.6  
Additionally, a series of high-profile publicity campaigns by local officials 
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples has brought the issue to the 
 
* Fellow, Sutherland Institute. 
 1. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th  Cir. 1982), cert. denied 458 U.S. 1111 
(1982); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1971); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); 
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 2. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993). 
 3. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 3, 1996); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
 4. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
 5. People v. West, 780 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (Just. Ct. 2004); Li v. State, No. 0404-03057, 
2004 WL 1258167, at *10 (Or. Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 2004). 
 6. Cases are pending in California, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, and Washington.  See 
David Crary, U.S. Taking Big Step on Gay Marriage, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), May 16, 
2004, at A1; Tim Evans, Same-Sex Marriage Debated Here, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 13, 2004, 
at A1. 
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forefront of national debate.7  Currently a proposed constitutional amendment 
to define marriage is pending in the United States Congress.8 
To summarize, the definition of marriage as it relates to same-sex couples 
emerged for the first time three decades ago.9  For two of those decades 
sporadic cases resulted in no progress toward getting the claim accepted.10  
When the first initial success was experienced, momentum began to build, but 
did not yield the end ultimately sought for another decade.11  However, when 
that ultimate victory was attained, it took only months to see major progress 
for the effort in other states.12 
The obvious question raised by this remarkable series of events is–how did 
it happen?  A few articles have been written which try to provide modest 
narratives for some of the events, but there is much we do not know and may 
not for years to come.13  There is, however, one major fact that is glaringly 
obvious to any observer–this has been a courtroom battle. 
This article will take the recent Massachusetts decision and the 
surrounding controversy it engendered as an example of the litigation-centered 
nature of the marriage debate.  The next section will provide a brief narrative 
of the redefinition of marriage in Massachusetts.  This will be followed by a 
critique of the judicially-driven nature of the effort to redefine marriage. 
II.  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Before November 17, 2003, only the Netherlands, Belgium, and some 
Canadian provinces had issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples under a 
regime where marriage had been redefined.14  How did Massachusetts come to 
this point? 
The short answer is that it did so pursuant to a court order.  The order was 
issued in November 2003 when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, ruled that the current definition of 
 
 7. West, 780 N.Y.S.2d 723; Cheryl Wetzstein, Licenses to Gays Top 2,000, WASH. TIMES, 
Feb. 17, 2004, at A1; William McCall, Multnomah Gay Marriage Halted, THE COLUMBIAN, Apr. 
21, 2004, at A1; Chris Frates, Gay Marriage Foes Protest Rulings By ‘Legal Barbarians’, 
DENVER POST, Feb. 22, 2004, at B1; Tom Feeney, Gay Marriage Licenses Halted, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Mar. 11, 2004, at 21. 
 8. H.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 108th Cong. (2003). 
 9. Baker, 191 N.W.2d 185. 
 10. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040; Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589; Baker, 191 N.W.2d 185; DeSanto, 
476 A.2d 952; Singer, 522 P.2d at 1189. 
 11. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968. 
 12. See West, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 725; Li, 2004 WL 1258167, at *10. 
 13. See Wetzstein, supra note 7; McCall, supra note 7; Frates, supra note 7; Feeney, supra 
note 7. 
 14. Colin Nickerson, Ontario Court OK’s Same-Sex Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11, 
2003, at A1. 
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marriage in the Commonwealth failed to satisfy rational basis under the state 
constitution.15 
The litigation culminating in this decision dates back to strategy meetings 
held in the early 1990s when activists discussed the possibility of litigation to 
obtain marriage licenses for same-sex couples.16  However, the genesis of the 
Massachusetts case can probably be traced to 1999 when the Vermont 
Supreme Court ruled that while the definition of marriage might not need to be 
changed, the benefits of marriage must be extended to same-sex couples in 
order to satisfy state constitutional guarantees.17  The Vermont Legislature 
responded by creating a new status of civil unions.18  While this result was 
certainly a milestone, it was not, strictly speaking, what the plaintiffs had 
sought–marriage licenses. 
After another planning meeting in 2000, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and 
Defenders (“GLAD”), co-counsel in the Vermont litigation, filed suit in a 
Suffolk County, Massachusetts court on behalf of seven same-sex couples.19  
Both the timing and the nature of the lawsuit were strategic.20  The plaintiffs 
were carefully selected after an interview process to ensure they would provide 
a sympathetic face for the legal claims.21  The jurisdiction was chosen because 
the legal culture evidenced a predisposition to accept the plaintiffs’ novel legal 
claims.22  The case also scrupulously avoided federal claims to ensure that 
federal officials could not affect the outcome.23 
As is now well-known, this careful planning paid off.  A 4-3 majority of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court enthusiastically embraced plaintiffs’ 
 
 15. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). 
 16. See David J. Garrow, Toward a More Perfect Union, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 9, 2004, at 
52. 
 17. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
 18. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2002). 
 19. Yvonne Abraham, 10 Years’ Work Led to Historic Win in Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
23, 2003, at A1. 
 20. A recent news report indicates that a same-sex couple sought legal help in securing a 
redefinition of marriage in Massachusetts as early as 1990, but GLAD decided that since the 
lawsuit was perceived to have “no chance of success” it was the wrong time to bring such a claim.  
Garrow, supra note 16, at 52. 
 21. Abraham, supra note 19.  (“The plaintiffs, who would serve as the public face of the 
lawsuit were chosen carefully.  They had to be varied in age, ethnicity, and profession.  They had 
to be well-spoken, but not too political.  They had to be longtime couples who had been faithful 
to one another.  They had to stand up to rigorous criminal background checks and to convince the 
lawyers that there were no skeletons in their closets.”); See also Elizabeth Mehren, Marriage Is 
Paramount, Gays Agree, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A18.  (GLAD “interviewed more than 100 
same-sex couples from across Massachusetts in order to find a mix of potential plaintiffs.”). 
 22. See Carolyn Lochhead, Lawyer’s Gay Rights Strategy-Patience While Public Adjusts, 
S.F. CHRONICLE, May 24, 2004, at A1; see also Abraham, supra note 19. 
 23. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948. 
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legal claims in November 2003.24  The majority concluded that Massachusetts’ 
marriage law was “rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are (or 
who are believed to be) homosexual.”25  Thus, the court took it upon itself to 
create a new definition of marriage: “the voluntary union of two persons as 
spouses, to the exclusion of all others.”26 
What is less well known is the role of the legislature in the saga of same-
sex marriage in Massachusetts.  In 2001, a citizen coalition gathered 76,607 
certified signatures (57,100 were needed) to place before the Massachusetts 
legislature a proposed constitutional amendment that, if passed, would have 
defined marriage as the union of a man and a woman and prevented the 
creation of a marriage equivalent.27  In order to be placed on the ballot, the 
measure needed to gain the support of 25% of legislators in two successive 
sessions.28  Evidencing a fear of the popular vote that bordered on 
“democraphobia,” the Goodridge lawyers lobbied the Attorney General and 
filed suit to prevent the legislature from considering the proposed 
amendment.29 
The courtroom effort was not necessary. The Senate President ensured that 
the bill would not get a vote by simply ending the constitutional convention 
before such a vote could be taken.30  The Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) ruled 
that this violated the Massachusetts Constitution, which calls for “final action” 
on initiative proposals, but nothing was done.31  If the legislature had voted at 
that time, the measure could have been on the November 2004 ballot.32 
In 2003, a new proposed amendment was introduced, but was not acted on 
until after the Goodridge decision.33  In response to the decision, the Senate 
President asked the SJC if it would approve of a civil union law that, like 
Vermont’s, provided all of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples under 
a different name.34  The court brusquely rejected the proposal, holding that it 
 
 24. Id. at 941. 
 25. Id. at 968. 
 26. Id. at 969. 
 27. See Wendy Herdlein, Something Old, Something New: Does the Massachusetts 
Constitution Provide for Same-Sex “Marriage”?, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 137, 178 n.215 (2002). 
 28. Id. at 178 n.214. 
 29. Albano v. Att’y Gen., 769 N.E.2d 1242, 1244 (Mass. 2002); Herdlein, supra note 27, at 
179. 
 30. Opinion of the Justices to the Acting Governor, 780 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Mass. 2002); 
Abraham, supra note 19. 
 31. MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, § 158; Opinion of the Justices to the Acting Governor, 780 
N.E.2d at 1235. 
 32. Opinion of the Justices to the Acting Governor, 780 N.E.2d at 1234. 
 33. William C. Duncan, Revisiting State Marriage Recognition Provisions, 38 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. (forthcoming December 2004). 
 34. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004). 
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would only be satisfied by the issuance of marriage licenses.35  Thus, the 
legislature returned to the proposed amendment but refused to squarely address 
the SJC’s decision, opting instead to propose an amendment that, while 
defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman, also simultaneously 
created a civil union status.36  The citizen-initiated amendment was never to 
reappear. 
The Governor, on the other hand, made some efforts to respond to the 
court decision.  When the legislature had approved its proposed amendment, he 
asked the Attorney General to petition the court to stay its decision until the 
amendment could be submitted to the popular vote.37  The Attorney General 
refused, and the legislature would not act on the Governor’s subsequent 
request for the appointment of a special counsel to pursue the option.38 
Same-sex marriage in Massachusetts was conceived in legal strategy 
meetings, midwifed by a timid legislature, and finally born in the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 
III.  JUDICIAL RULE: A CRITIQUE 
A determination that the redefinition of marriage has been, to this point, 
solely a judicial accomplishment does not lead necessarily to a normative 
conclusion.  Certainly one might argue that the definition of marriage is an 
appropriate subject for judicial oversight.  This proposition can be tested by 
asking (1) whether the judiciary has legal authority to redefine marriage, (2) 
whether the legal profession may have particular insights that fit it for deciding 
the question, and (3) what the results of litigation-created marriage policy 
might be for broader society. 
A. Separation of Powers 
Some judges have recognized the separation of powers problem inherent in 
judicially mandated marriage policy.  Perhaps most succinct is this statement 
from a concurring opinion in a same-sex marriage decision from the District of 
Columbia: 
It seems obvious that the remedy for the dilemma facing these appellants lies 
exclusively with the legislature . . . no court can order a legislature to enact a 
particular statute so as to achieve a result that the court might consider 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. The amendment must be approved again in the next legislative session before it is 
subject to a vote in the general election.  Jennifer Peter, State Moves Toward Gay Marriage Ban, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 30, 2004, at 6A. 
 37. Raphael Lewis, Romney Seeks Authority to Delay Same-Sex Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Apr. 16, 2004, at A1. 
 38. Id. 
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desirable, or to appropriate money for a purpose that the court might deem 
worthy of being funded. The separation of powers doctrine prohibits such 
action by a court.39 
In noting its duty to defer to the legislature on matters such as the definition of 
marriage, the trial court opinion in the Massachusetts case linked this 
deference with “separation of powers principles, which are even stronger when 
a court is asked to invalidate, rather than simply interpret, a legislative 
enactment.”40  One irony of the SJC’s reversal of the lower court is that the 
Massachusetts Constitution, on which the SJC purported to rely, contains a 
very strong formulation of the principle of separation of powers: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall 
never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them: the 
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of 
them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or 
either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.41 
Criticisms of judicial actions that are seen as encroaching on legislative or 
executive authority are, of course, legion and have been raised throughout the 
history of the republic.42  It is not likely that anyone would argue that if a court 
were to directly enact statutes, it would be violating the principle of separation 
of powers.43  In the same-sex marriage cases, the courts have tried to avoid this 
charge by characterizing their actions as straightforward applications of clear 
constitutional principles to challenged law.44  The Vermont Supreme Court’s 
marriage decision asserts that “it is important to emphasize at the outset that it 
is the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution we are 
construing.”45  Similarly, the Massachusetts SJC invokes “the traditional and 
settled role of courts to decide constitutional issues” and, not surprisingly, 
includes the definition of marriage as part of this class of issues. 46 
These assertions notwithstanding, what the courts do in both cases looks 
very much like usurping the legislative function.  The remedy provided by the 
Vermont court, for instance, ordered the legislature to create legislation to 
 
 39. Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Terry, J., concurring). 
 40. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, No. 20011647A, 2002 WL 1299135, at *5 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. May 7, 2002). 
 41. MASS. CONST. art. XXX, § 31 (emphasis added). 
 42. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 63-64 (1989-
1990). 
 43. See MASS. CONST. art. XXX, § 31. 
 44. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 
744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
 45. Baker, 744 A.2d at 870. 
 46. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 966. 
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provide the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples.47  Lest a legislator 
mistake the mandate, the court specified: “In the event that the benefits and 
protections in question are not statutorily granted, plaintiffs may petition this 
Court to order the remedy they originally sought.”48  In an effort to avoid the 
Vermont result (an alternative marital status), the Massachusetts SJC was more 
direct.  It promulgated a new legal definition of marriage: “We construe civil 
marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the 
exclusion of all others.”49  As a result of some less than artful phrasing in the 
opinion,50 the Massachusetts Legislature speculated that it might be able to 
satisfy the court by offering a Vermont-style alternative to marriage.51  In 
rejecting the proposal,52 the court further elucidated the legislative nature of its 
remedy: “The purpose of the stay was to afford the Legislature an opportunity 
to conform the existing statutes to the provisions of the Goodridge decision.”53 
Judicial review has generally involved a court decision that challenged 
legislation as unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable.54  This allows the 
legislature to amend a law to address the constitutional infirmity or enact new 
legislation which avoids the problem. Of course, in doing so, the court could 
conceivably infringe on the legislature’s authority (such as by holding a law 
unconstitutional without any legal basis for doing so).  In these cases the 
problem is more clear; yet, however characterized, decisions which require 
legislatures to write new statutes cannot escape the charge of being legislative 
in nature. 
B. Professional Supremacy 
Even without specific authority to decide controversial questions such as 
the definition of marriage, are courts and lawyers better equipped than 
legislatures to address these matters?  The answer to that question may vary 
based on one’s view of appropriate outcomes, since, for better or worse, the 
legal process seems to make certain substantive outcomes more likely. 
In his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia suggested an 
explanation for this: “Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the 
product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called 
 
 47. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. 
 50. Id. at 965 n.29 (“We are concerned only with the withholding of the benefits, 
protections, and obligations of civil marriage from a certain class of persons for invalid 
reasons.”). 
 51. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 568-69 (Mass. 2004). 
 52. Id. at 572. 
 53. Id. at 568. 
 54. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948; Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. 
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homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some 
homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has 
traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.”55  After that decision, a news 
report quoted Mark Tushnet, president of the Association of American Law 
Schools, as saying that “clearly, the legal profession and the law professoriate 
is strongly in favor” of “nondiscrimination against gays.”56  Indeed, both the 
American Bar Association and the American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers have specifically announced their opposition to the proposed federal 
marriage amendment.57  It is understandable that the American public may 
view such opposition as lawyers protecting “their” turf.58  Regardless of 
whether or not the legal profession is best equipped to resolve societal 
disputes, there is certainly evidence that it is likely to resolve such matters in 
certain ways.59  This, of course, opens the profession to charges like Justice 
Scalia’s that the profession is “an ‘elite’ of presumptuous specialists.”60 
In the wake of public criticism of recent opinions favoring “gay rights” 
positions, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund came to the defense of 
judges accused of being “activists.”61  Specifically, they launched an ad 
campaign based around the message that “[t]here are some pretty conservative 
judges behind the recent gay rights court victories.”62  The evidence?  “Four of 
the six justices who voted to strike down the [Texas sodomy] law were 
appointed by Republicans” and “[s]ix of the seven judges [on the 
Massachusetts SJC] were appointed by Republicans.”63  In a related document, 
Lambda singled out one Massachusetts justice who was appointed by a 
Republican governor and who the Boston Globe is said to have described as 
“one of the court’s more conservative voices.”64  Leaving aside the question of 
whether the Globe would be considered an accurate judge of conservatism, 
Lambda’s defense seems wholly unresponsive to the criticism.  The fact that 
 
 55. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 56. Tony Mauro, Scalia Jab at ‘Law Profession Culture’ Debated, LEGAL TIMES, July 7, 
2003, at 9. 
 57. See Michael Collins, Experts Oppose Amendment, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 24, 2004, at 
A9; Gay Marriage A-OK with Divorce Lawyers, ADVOC. REP. 30 (June 22, 2004). 
 58. See Leigh Jones, Gay Divorce as New Practice Area, NAT’L L.J., June 28, 2004, at 1. 
 59. Mauro, supra note 56. 
 60. See RUSSELL KIRK, THE WISE MEN KNOW WHAT WICKED THINGS ARE WRITTEN ON 
THE SKY 87 (1987); Mauro, supra note 56. 
 61. LAMDA LEGAL, The Real Story Behind the Right-Wing “Activist Judge” Smear 
Campaign, Mar. 2, 2004, at http://www.lamdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/ 
record?record=1451 [hereinafter Real Story]. 
 62. LAMDA LEGAL, Judging Discrimination, Mar. 3, 2004, at http://www.lamdalegal.org/ 
cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1450. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Real Story, supra note 61. 
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judges are appointed by members of one political party hardly indicates that 
they are immune to considerations prevalent in their professional culture. 
What characteristics of the segments of the legal profession that support 
these social changes might contribute to their specific positions on substantive 
legal issues?  Professor Carl Schneider hypothesized that “the trend toward 
diminished moral discourse [in family law] is most actively promoted by 
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars who are, relative to the state legislators and 
judges who would otherwise decide family law questions, affluent, educated, 
and elite.  This group’s views on family law questions are (relatively) liberal, 
secular, modern, and noninterventionist.”65  Similarly, Professor Walter Berns 
noted that elements of the modern judiciary have become what the U.S. 
Supreme Court aspired to be in Dred Scott v. Sanford,66 namely, “the initiator 
of social change.”67  Professor Robert Nagel has identified some specific 
“lawyers’ intellectual inclinations” that might shape their response to these 
issues: (1) “lawyers are not at home with plain or obvious meaning” as 
opposed to “subtle or surprising interpretation[s]”; (2) “because so many 
disputes that are resolved through adjudication involve individuals, we tend to 
conceive of constitutional issues in terms of rights that belong to individuals, 
rather than in terms of more abstract matters like public understanding or 
organizational structure”; and (3) “we have an understandable, sometimes 
touching, inclination to favor judicial processes and judicial power over less 
familiar alternatives.”68  He offers as example the fact that “[t]he legal 
mind . . . has made it somehow credible, even compelling, to find in the 
Constitution a whole set of rights involving a kind of behavior–sexual 
behavior–that without doubt is no part of the subject matter of the 
Constitution’s content or design.”69 
What does this mean for issues like the definition of marriage, the 
resolution of which some suggest should be left to the legal profession?  It is 
not absolutely clear, because the redefinition of marriage may be the most 
significant social change confined to lawsuits. Even the consequential creation 
and spread of “no-fault” divorce, while certainly involving input from the legal 
profession, was legislatively enacted.70  There are some suggestive indications 
of what the role of lawyers might mean for social issues. 
 
 65. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 
83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1821 (1985). 
 66. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 67. WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 218-19 (1987). 
 68. Robert F. Nagel, A Comment on the Rule of Law Model of Separation of Powers, 30 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 355, 355-56 (1989). 
 69. Id. at 356. 
 70. See J. Herbie DiFonzo, No Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph of Naked 
Divorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519 (1994). 
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For instance, while politics is the art of the possible, requiring its 
participants to gain consensus and make compromises, court decisions are 
generally not subject to the same constraints.  At the appellate level, a set of 
judges will have to come to consensus on a decision, an effort that will usually 
be confined to agreement between a small number of members of the same 
class with similar backgrounds, training and interests.  Thus, courts may be 
open to the temptation to pursue a kind of perfectionism.  For instance, courts 
and legal professionals may be tempted to gloss over complexities inherent in 
social institutions which have developed organically over time in favor of 
abstract concepts such as equality or individual rights.  The court can remove 
significant elements of the institution of marriage (for instance, its links to 
procreation and sex difference) when they fail to fit into the Procrustean bed of 
legal analysis.  Additionally, as noted by Professor Robert Nagel: 
Law reform litigation promotes suspiciousness in another way as well.  
Something about the urgency and intense moralism of constitutional 
argumentation in the adversary system produces a heedlessness bordering on 
lawlessness.  Litigation unleashes the same kinds of unrestrained energy and 
commitment as warfare.  This is precisely why sophisticated gay rights 
activists can urge “ongoing guerilla warfare against bigoted precedents, laws, 
and policies.71 
A more obvious potential consequence is the exclusion of outside 
pressures, i.e., those not represented by lawyers, that might be brought to bear 
in the determination of important social issues.  In other words, the issue would 
be left to the “experts.”  A review of test cases involving children noted that 
“case studies also suggest that litigation may amplify the voices of certain 
actors or interest groups and mute those of others.”72  Professor Walter Berns 
notes this inherent problem with judicial rule: 
Chief among its presumed advantages is that it is governed by lawyers, and 
lawyers are governed by a “professional ideal of reflective and dispassionate 
analysis of the problem before [them] and [are] likely to have some experience 
in putting this ideal into practice.”  Not only that, but it is a judge who presides 
over the process, a judge whose “professional tradition insulates him from 
narrow political pressures.”  Which is to say, the judge, unlike members of 
Congress, is insulated from the voters and, for that reason, is better able to 
govern.73 
 
 71. Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 167, 185 (1997) (quoting 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner’s Sex and Reason: Steps 
Toward a Gaylegal Agenda 102 YALE L. J. 333, 386 (1992)). 
 72. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 518 (1985). 
 73. BERNS, supra note 67, at 219 (quoting Abran Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public 
law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (1976)). 
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The nature of “strategic” litigation, whereby advocates can choose their 
forum and select certain kinds of plaintiffs, intensifies the problems created by 
this lack of accountability.  Thus, some have publicly called on same-sex 
couples not to file lawsuits in certain jurisdictions so that victories in more 
“sympathetic” jurisdictions can be used to leverage their arguments later and 
get a result that would otherwise be unlikely.74 
One does not have to accept the charge that judges are becoming “partisans 
in the culture war” to be concerned about their involvement.75  Professor Berns 
argues that “to allow the judges to ‘create’ constitutional rights means to 
endow them with the authority to impose their ‘values’ on the country; in 
practice, of course, what they will impose will be the currently fashionable 
‘values.’”76  Professor Nagel makes the important point that “good legal 
thinking can be constitutionally dysfunctional.”77  He continues: 
If we lawyers insist that our habits and standards should constrain how the 
Constitution is to be understood, we should face up to how our intellectual 
norms may be destructive to constitutional values.  If the development of 
pragmatic doctrine helps us lose sight of our Constitution’s basic design–under 
which the Congress should be held accountable for making the laws and the 
President for executing them–sophistication will have helped do us in.78 
C. Consent of the Governed 
It is the nature of an adversarial legal system that it will produce “winners” 
and “losers.” The same-sex couple plaintiffs in Massachusetts are the clear 
winners in the Goodridge case.  Are there losers?  What does the decision 
mean for them? 
The Goodridge decision was not oblivious to those who would object to its 
redefinition of marriage.  At the beginning of its opinion, the Massachusetts 
SJC noted that there were strongly held opinions on both sides of the issue of 
redefining marriage but claimed that neither was dispositive.79  The Goodridge 
court provides interesting characterizations of the opposing viewpoints on this 
issue. Those who disagree with the court’s decision (the “losers” in 
Goodridge) are characterized as follows: “Many people hold deep-seated 
religious, moral, and ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to the 
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union of one man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral.”80  
Those who will agree with the court’s decision (the “winners” in Goodridge) 
are described as follows: “Many hold equally strong religious, moral, and 
ethical convictions that same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and that 
homosexual persons should be treated no differently from their heterosexual 
neighbors.”81  Thus, opponents of redefining marriage are implicitly charged 
with believing that homosexual persons should not be treated the same as 
heterosexual persons.  The disdain this passage seems to show to those who 
oppose redefining marriage is buttressed in later passages in the opinion where 
the court states that “[t]he marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on 
a very real segment of the community for no rational reason.”82  This, to the 
court, “suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices 
against persons who are (or who are believed to be) homosexual.”83  The 
concurring opinion of one justice is more forthright: 
I am hopeful that our decision will be accepted by those thoughtful citizens 
who believe that same-sex unions should not be approved by the State.  I am 
not referring here to acceptance in the sense of grudging acknowledgment of 
the court’s authority to adjudicate the matter.  My hope is more liberating.  The 
plaintiffs are members of our community, our neighbors, our coworkers, our 
friends.  As pointed out by the court, their professions include investment 
advisor, computer engineer, teacher, therapist, and lawyer.  The plaintiffs 
volunteer in our schools, worship beside us in our religious houses, and have 
children who play with our children, to mention just a few ordinary daily 
contacts.  We share a common humanity and participate together in the social 
contract that is the foundation of our Commonwealth.  Simple principles of 
decency dictate that we extend to the plaintiffs, and to their new status, full 
acceptance, tolerance, and respect.  We should do so because it is the right 
thing to do.84 
While no thoughtful person would argue that decency dictates extending to all 
persons acceptance, tolerance, and respect, the concurrence seems to go 
further, making the implicit suggestion that not embracing the redefinition of 
marriage would violate “simple principles of decency.”85 
A legal commentator has recently noted, in regard to U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that seek to end serious social divisions, that sometimes this self-
imposed responsibility “pushes them to adopt tactics that are likely to 
aggravate the very problem they seek to address.  If the nation’s divisions are 
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 85. Id. 
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to be healed, the healing will not come about by life-tenured officials issuing 
indictments that accuse millions of their fellow citizens of animus, prejudice, 
hostility, or hatred.”86  Another has noted: “In the campaigns conducted by 
litigators (it goes without saying), the opinions of the majority are deprecated 
and their political efforts are set aside.”87 
Defenders of controversial decisions might respond that the aim of such 
decisions is more modest.  For instance, a commentator has argued that 
“Lawrence [v. Texas, which invalidated a Texas sodomy law] is best 
interpreted as an opening bid in a conversation between the Court and the 
American public.”88  However, one usually thinks of conversations as being 
two-sided, so the comparison may not be apt.  While courts may refrain from 
making certain decisions for a time (which approximates listening in the 
conversation analogy), as long as they adhere to an aggressive approach to 
judicial review, they will retain the last word.  The public’s enthusiasm for a 
conversation in which one party sets the terms and always reserves the final 
word is not likely to last forever.  What happens if the court opens the 
conversation and the Nation disagrees?  Does the court reverse itself?  This 
does not seem likely.  More likely, the court might need to “call[] the 
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by 
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”89  In other words, 
end the discussion. 
Whether the court is scolding citizens for their unenlightened views or 
engaging them in a conversation or lecture about constitutional values, the 
result is likely to be alienation of swaths of society (in the case of same-sex 
marriage, probably a majority) who are the “losers” in litigation over social 
issues.  This is especially true for non-lawyers who have no way of directly 
participating in the debate.  As Professor Robert Nagel notes: 
It seems quite possible that in the years ahead the pace of social transformation 
will only accelerate and that many Americans, caught up in powerful forces 
beyond their control, will feel increasingly frightened, isolated, and unable to 
shape their lives.  Moreover, lawyers and judges seem likely to continue to 
play a role in producing this destabilization and alienation.  Among other 
questions, the legal establishment might wonder what people in such a 
condition will do if their naive faith in legalistic defenses is destroyed.90 
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As noted above, in responding to criticisms of the judicial nature of the 
debate over redefining marriage, those who support the change are fond of 
invoking the principle that only courts can vindicate the rights of unpopular 
minorities.91  This is sometimes true, but the history of our legal system does 
not encourage sanguinity about the ability of the court to always decide rightly 
on these matters.92  The court is more likely to succeed if it sticks closely to 
actual constitutional provisions and avoids the temptation to insert its policy 
preferences into the controversy at issue.  In addition, a court decision that runs 
strongly against the trend of popular feeling has to be enforced by some 
mechanism.  In cases where the opposition to the court’s policy is particularly 
strong, that enforcement mechanism may have to be highly compulsory or 
punitive to have the desired effect.  A decision that is clearly rooted in clear 
constitutional text or the Nation’s history and tradition are less likely to 
engender this kind of opposition.  A decision which is meant to vindicate a 
nebulous and highly controversial value supposedly inherent in a constitution 
will not command the respect of the citizenry or acquire the legitimacy 
necessary to be enforced by tradition, custom, and usage rather than through 
punitive means. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
It is unlikely that the debate over the redefinition of marriage will end 
soon.  There are still many unanswered questions and unresolved 
controversies.  Will one state have to recognize another state’s same-sex 
marriage?  Will the U.S. Supreme Court address the issue?  Can constitutions 
be read to require a redefinition of marriage?  How will a redefinition of 
marriage affect the cultural understanding of the institution? 
The matter, though, extends far beyond the questions of marriage and the 
legal recognition of same-sex unions.  This debate also requires us to face 
questions about the rule of law, the nature of social institutions, and the 
constitutional status of radical personal autonomy.  This paper has attempted to 
address one of these core questions–the appropriate respective roles of the 
legislature and the judiciary (and, to some extent, the executive) in social 
controversies.  Along with this central question are corollary matters such as 
the limits of judicial decision-making authority and the legislature’s ability to 
enforce constitutional guarantees.  The answers to these questions will have 
implications beyond the discrete areas of the definition of marriage and even 
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domestic relations.  Reaching appropriate, constitutionally sound answers is 
crucial. 
I have suggested that in the litigation to redefine marriage, the balance of 
power has shifted too far in the direction of judicial supremacy to the point that 
a legislature (like that of Massachusetts) acts as if it has little or no ability to 
address a critical substantive issue.  Proponents of redefining marriage seem to 
have little hesitation about seeing the issue removed from the public debate.  
When other branches intervene, it is often with the implied purpose of securing 
a court resolution (as in the California and New York litigation over the 
authority of local mayors to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples). 
If a social issue of such importance is consigned solely to the courtroom, 
the specter of disenfranchisement will be raised.  As capable as lawyers may 
be, it cannot plausibly be argued that our constitutional order was intended to 
prevent the political branches from addressing controversial questions when 
they are raised in the litigation context.  Justice Andrew J. Kleinfeld’s 
comment is entirely apposite: “The Founding Fathers did not establish the 
United States as a democratic republic so that elected officials would decide 
trivia, while all great questions would be decided by the judiciary.”93  
Recognition of this principle by litigants or judges cannot come too soon. 
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